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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris,1 issued on July 6, 1983, requires
employers to convert to sex-neutral systems for payment
of employee retirement annuity and pension benefits. In
Norris, the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.,2 as amended, prohibits the use of sex-based
actuarial tables to calculate sex-differentiated employee
retirement benefits.3 This prohibition applies whether
the employer provides retirement benefits through selfinsurance or funds its plan through an insurance contract
with an outside insurer.4 Both public and private
employer must abide by the decision, but insurance or
annuities obtained outside of the employment context
cannot be reached under Title VII and hence are outside
the prohibition.
Many employers, particularly those with selfinsured plans, converted to sex-neutral systems5 prior to
Norris because of numerous cases foreshadowing the
Court's decision, including the Supreme Court's 1978
landmark decision in Los Angeles Dept. of Uilter &
l. 103 S.Ct.3492 (1983).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
3. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides:
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer (1) to ... discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or (2) ... limit, segregate, or classify his employees ...
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities ... because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
4. Employee pension plans are typically funded through either a
group annuity contract offered by a life insurance company, called an
insured plan, or through a trust established by an employer and administered through a bank or trust company, sometimes called a
trusteed or noninsured plan. See A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF
PRIVATE PENSIONS 216-17 (1982).
5. According to a recent survey by the National Association of State
Budget Officers, by early 1983, the following 37 states had adopted
sex-neutral actuarial tables for their primary state employee retirement plans: Alaska (Jan. 1981); Arizona (1976); Arkansas (1957);
California (July 1982); Colorado (Jan. 1980); Connecticut (Oct.
1982); Delaware (since inception of plan); Hawaii (July 1982); Idaho
(Jan. 1979); Illinois (Sept. 1961); Indiana (ca 1980); Iowa (Nov. 1979);
Kansas (date unknown); Louisiana (1970); Maine (late 1960);
Maryland (Jan. 1981); Michigan (1982); Minnesota (1977); Mississippi (July 1980); Missouri (197211977); Montana (1979); Nevada (June
1982); New Hampshire (1982); New Jersey (July 1979); North
Carolina (1981); North Dakota (1977); Ohio (Apr. 1983); Oregon
(1978); South Carolina (Jan. 1982); South Dakota (July 1974); Tennessee (July 1982); Texas (Sept. 1975); Utah (Jan. 1982); Vermont
(1981/1982); Washington (1982/1983); Wisconsin (since inception);
Wyoming (July 1981).
Three of those states, Arkansas, Delaware, and Wisconsin, have
used sex-neutral tables since the inception of their retirement systems.
In another ten states, use of sex-neutral actuarial tables predates the
imposition of such tables on state by the Supreme Court's decision in

Power v. Manhan.6 In Manhan, the Court ruled that an
employer had violated Title VII by requiring its female
employees to make larger contributions to a pension fund

Los Angeles Dept. of Ubter & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978). The remaining twenty-four states converted after 1978. Among
the thirteen responding states that did not use sex-neutral factors at
the time of the survey, two states were to adopt sex-neutral factors on
July I, 1983, and two more states were considering legislation to implement such factors. See Hearings on S. 3'12 Before the Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Tmnsportation, 98th Cong., !st Sess. 201
(1983) (testimony of Raymond C. Scheppach, ex. dir., Nat') Governors' Ass'n); Reaction to Norris Decision Varies Among Public
Employee Plans, 10 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 453 at 1196-99 (July 18,
1983).
In many localities, teachers, city workers, police, and firefighters
are covered by separate local governmental pension systems. These
systems may or may not have converted to sex-neutral tables in the
states listed above. In addition, some states offer voluntary supplemental retirement plans. The sex-based plan challenged in Norris, for example, was a supplemental deferred compensation plan for
Arizona state employees; Arizona's primary retirement plan, however, used a sex-neutral system.
--Many private employers also converted to sex-neutral pension
systems prior to Norris. According to a survey conducted by Buck
Consultants, Inc., of 264 companies maintaining a total of 566 plans
(including 257 companies with defined benefit plans and 309 defined
contribution plans maintained by 2fJ7 companies), 58% of the 255
companies with defined benefit plans offering annuity options had
sex-distinct factors at the time of the Norris decision, but they report
they will now convert to sex-neutral systems. In 1978, when Manhart
was d(!cided, II% of the total number of surveyed firms were using
unisex factors for most of their plans and for most plan purposes.
"From the start of 1978 through early 1983, an additional 29% of the
companies converted to unisex option factors, and 42 % of the companies had converted to unisex option factors by the time Norris was
decided, according to the survey." See Firms Plan to Switch to Unisex
Plans in Response to Norris, Buck Survey Says, 10 PENS. REP. No.
469 at 1688-89 (Nov. 7, 1983). Of the 2fJ7 surveyed companies with
defined contribution plans, 41 % are potentially affected by Norris. Of
that group, only 16% were already operating on a unisex basis when
Norris was decided.
6. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). As the Supreme Court noted in Norris, 463
U.S. _ _ n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 3492 n. 9, all but one of the lower courts
that had previously considered the question held that sexdifferentiated retirement benefits are no more permissible under Title
VII than are sex-differentiated employee pension plan contribution
rates. See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n (TIAA), 691 F.2d
1054 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S.ct. 3565 (1983)
modified and ajfd, 735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, _ _ US.
__ (1984). Retired Pub. Employees' Ass'n of Cal. v. California,
677 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 714 F.2d 95 (9th
Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (!st Cir. 1978);
Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 515 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Hannahs v. New York State Teachers Retirement
Sys., 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 5Tl (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Probe v.
State Teachers' Retirement Sys., Tl Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1306 (C.D. CAL. 1981); Shaw v. International Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 995 (C.D. Cal.
1980). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(f) (1984) ("It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to have a pension or retirement
plan ... which differentiates in benefits on the basis of sex"). But see
Peters v. Wayne State Univ. 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated,
103 S.Ct. 3566 (1983).
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than similarly situated male employees in order to obtain
the same monthly benefits upon retirement. Norris extends the Manhart requirement of sex neutrality in contributions to the benefit stage. Some employers did not
quickly comply with Manhart, and similar footdragging
with respect to the requirements of Norris should be
anticipated.7
After Norris, there is no legitimate excuse for public
or private employers who do not bring their employee
retirement plans into compliance with Title VII. Norris
requires all covered employers8 with employee retirement
plans to provide sex-neutral benefits based on pension or
annuity plan contributions made after August 3, 1983; in
addition, under certain circumstances, discussed below,
benefits based on contributions made prior to August 3,
1983, should be paid on a sex-neutral basis. Those
employers who do not quickly and voluntarily comply
become potential targets for Title VII enforcement
actions.
While the decision in Norris advances economic
equality for women and men, there are significant lirnitations on its impact. The employer in Norris was required
to provide sex-neutral payments only for those benefits
based on pension or annuity plan contributions made
after August 1, 1983. That ruling on retroactivity sharply
restricts the scope of relief for active and retired

7. See, e.g., Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 515
F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In 1983, the New York City
Retirement System announced that it would bring its system into compliance with Manhart (decided in 1978), and that it would refund excess contributions, an estimated total of five million dollars, made by
women employees during the post-Manhart period. See Money To Go
To Women For Excess Pension Payments, Civil Service Sentinel, Dec.
26, 1983 at 5; City Trustees Vote to Refund $5 Million to Female Participants, 10 PENS. REP. (BNA) No.473 at 18(]7 (Dec. 5, 1983).
Another year passed, however, before the city brought its plan into
compliance for future contributions. In February 1985, in partial settlement of relief issues, the city also agreed to equalize (for class
members who were active employees on or before July 31, 1983) contribution rates with the lower rates applicable to similarly situated
males retroactive to April 25, 1978, the date of the Manhart decision,
with interest. See Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York,
75 Civ. 2868 (MJL), Proposed Consent Decree (Feb. 13, 1985).
8. Title VII defines "employer" as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for
each working day in each of twenty or more calender weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Title VII also makes unlawful certain employment practices of labor organizations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(c), which are defined as follows: "a labor organization engaged
in an industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such an
organization ..." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d), and those of employment
agencies, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(b).
Title VII was amended, effective March 24, 1972, to include state
and local government employers within its coverage. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(a) and (f).
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employees unless the plan fits under various conversion
and cost theories explained later.9 Another limitation
derives from the perimeters of Title VII itself. Norris affects only employer-sponsored plans, leaving many
women who purchase annuities or insurance plans on the
open market subject to lower benefits calculated from
sex-based mortality tables. 10
Moreover, the Norris decision does not address the
harsh economic realities often faced by older women.
Retired women workers are often doubly disadvantaged
by discrimination. First, many women are employed in
low-wage industries and in occupations without pension
plans. 11 49 percent of men are covered by a private pension plan on their longest job compared to only 21 percent of women.12 Furthermore, even if covered by a pension plan, interrupted work patterns frequently disqualify
women from receiving pension benefits. Prior to enactment of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, few women
received pension credits for employment before the age
of twenty five or for the years in which they worked less
than 1000 hours.13 Divorced homemakers had little or no
income protection and widows were left without anticipated pension benefits if their spouse's plan terminated on the worker's death, or if he did not elect a
plan option providing for survivors' benefits. 14 In

9. See infra text and accompanying notes 98-103, 109-118.
10. See infra notes 32 and 61; Comment, A Step Toward Insurance
Equity: Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 251 (1984). Some pension and annuity industry experts are concerned that the Norris decision may result in adverse selection. Men
who will receive lower sex-neutral benefits upon retirement under
employer-sponsored plans may elect to take their accumulations out
of their employer-sponsored fund as a cash lump sum and purchase
higher yielding annuities on the open-market where benefits may still
be calculated on the basis of sex. Hager & Zimpleman, The Norris
Decision, Its Implications and Application, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 913,
940 (1982-83). But see infra note 80 and accompanying text, regarding relative rarity of lump sum options in defined benefit plans, the
type of plan covering the majority of workers.
11. About eighty-five percent of state and local workers are covered
by pension plans, compared to about forty-nine per cent of the private
work force. PRESIDENT'S COMM"N ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF
AGE: TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 12, 16
(1981). On the average, public sector plans pay higher benefits than
private sector plans. In the private sector, the largest percentage of
covered workers is found in the highly unionized manufacturing, mining, and transportation industries while the lowest percentage is found
in the non-union service and retail trade industries, where women
tend to be concentrated. See A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF
PRIVATE PENSIONS 199-206 (1982).
12. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., WOMEN AND RETIREMENT
INCOME PROGRAMS: CURRENT ISSUES OF EQUITY AND ADEQUACY 11,
H.R. Doc. NO. 190, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979).
13. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE:
TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY, 27-28, (1981),
[hereinafter cited as PENSION POLICY].
14. PENSION POLICY, supra note 13, at 32.
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1982, nearly 40 percent of older men and only 19 percent
of older women had some income from pensions and/or
annuities. 15 The problems have now been addressed, at
least in part, by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984.16
In addition to low rates of coverage, women are
disadvantaged by lower benefits.17 When women workers
who are covered by a pension plan retire, they frequently
receive pension benefits based upon discriminatorily
depressed wages. 18 So, two discriminatory factors are
present. On top of their economically disadvantaged
position, sex-based actuarial tables result in retired
women receiving even lower pension benefits than
similarly situated men. Norris merely addresses the latter
discrimination: the application of sex-based actuarial
tables in making benefit computations. Therefore, it has
limited impact on the overall economic plight of older
women.
The factors discussed above have contributed to the
relegation of elderly women to the very bottom of the

15. s. Rix, OLDER WOMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF AGING, Women's
Research and Education Institute of the Congressional Caucus for
Women's Issues 9-10 (1984).
16. The Act reduces the maximum age conditions, for purposes of
participation (21) and minimum vesting requirements (18), adopts
more liberal "breaks in service" rules for non-vested participants
(maternity and paternity leaves are not treated as a break in service),
and requires plans to provide automatic survivor benefits to the surviving spouse of a retiree or a vested participant who dies before
retirement, unless the spouse consents to waive such benefits. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 102 (a)-(e), 103 (a),
202 (d)-(e), 98 Stat. 794 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of26 and 29 U.S.C.).
17. The median private pension amount in 1976 for men was $2,060
and for women was $1,340, while the median public pension amounts
were $4,830 for men and $2,750 for women. See WOMEN'S STUDIES
PROGRAM AND POLICY CENTER AT GEORGE WASHINCITON UNIVERSITY, OLDER WOMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 8-12 (1980).
18. See generally COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION
AND ANALYSIS, ASSEMBLY OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE
(D. Treiman & H. Hartman, eds. 1981); TREIMAN, HARTMAN &
Roos, Assessing Pay Discrimination Using National Data, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 137-54 (Remick ed.
1984); SPECIAL ISSUE: COMPARABLE WORTH, 8 WOMEN'S RTS.L.REP.
(Winter 1984).
In 1939, median earnings for women who worked year round,
full-time in the experienced labor force were fifty-eight percent of the
median earnings for men. In 1981, women's earnings were at fiftynine percent of the median for men. See BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, No. 673, THE FEMALE-MALE
EARNINGS GAP: A REVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS ISSUES
(1982). The gap is even larger for minority women. See U.S. Dept.
of Labor News Release 84-443 (Oct. 29,1984). During a time marked
by a dramatic increase in the number of women in the labor force, the
wage gap has been a major factor leading to the "feminization of
poverty." See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
WOMEN AT WORK 28 (1983).
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economic ladder in this country. According to U.S.
Department of Labor statistics, in 1979, women over 65
had the lowest median income of any sex or age
group-$2,800. This figure was approximately one-half
of the median income for men in that age bracket. In
1977, the median income for women over 65 was $3,087,
compared to $5,526 for men. More than 2.6 million
older women had incomes below the poverty level in
1983. While women account for only 59 percent of the
total non-institutionalized aged population, they account
for 71 percent of the elderly poor.19 Although Norris does
not address these broader economic concerns, it will
benefit many women covered by employer-sponsored
retirement and other fringe benefit plans.
This article is intended to help employees and practitioners determine whether an employer's pension or annuity plan violates Title VII, and if so, to identify the
scope of relief which may be obtained. Part I discusses
the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona Governing
Committee v. Norris. Part II discusses the various types
of pension and retirement plans, and describes how to
identify sex discrimination in typical plans. Part ill briefly addresses the more difficult question of how to remedy
employer non-compliance, and discusses the relief issues
raised by both retirees and present employees (with
reagard to benefits based on post-Norris contributions
and pre-Norris contributions) once a Title VII violation
has been found.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE V. NORRIS.
In Norris, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to strict standards of employer sex-neutrality under
Title VII. Nathalie Norris and a class of women employed by the state of Arizona filed their case in 1978,
shortly after the Court's Manhart decision. They charged
that the state's deferred compensation plan unlawfully
discriminated on the basis of sex by providing smaller
monthly retirement annuity-benefits to women than to
similarly situated men. The Arizona plan paid different
sums to men and women based solely on the sex of the
employee while ignoring such individual characteristics
as medical history, weight, smoking or alcohol
consumption.
Arizona advanced a series of arguments to avoid
responsibility for the sex-based operation of its deferred
compensation plan. Arizona first argued that whatever
the intrinsic illegality of sex-discriminatory annuity

19. Rix, supra note 15, at 13.
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payments, it could not be held legally responsible for the
discriminatory activities of the insurance companies
which it had selected to invest and disburse its
employees' deferred compensation funds. Arizona also
argued that the sex-based plan did riot violate Title VII
because: 1) it was based on legitimate actuarial data indicating that women, as a group, live longer than men;
2) it was purely voluntary; 3) it permitted women to
avoid the effects of discriminatory annuity payments by
opting to receive their deferred compensation in a lump
sum payment; 4) it left women annuitants no worse off
than if they had purchased private annuities on the open
market; and 5) the state had not intended to discriminate
against women when it adopted the plan. Arizona further
argued that even if its deferred compensation plan
violated Title VII, it should not be required to increase
the monthly payments of women annuitants to eliminate
the unlawful discrimination.
In deciding the Norris case, the lower courts held
that none of Arizona's arguments served to validate its
provision of an employee fringe benefit which treated individual women less favorably than individual men, solely because of their sex. The district court enjoined the
state from carrying out its obligations under the deferred
compensation plan through use of sex-based actuarial
tables and ordered that future annuity payments to retired
women employees be made equal t:o those for similarly
situated male employees.20
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the deferred compensation plan was
a "privilege" of employment and a "fringe benefit," and
therefore covered by Title VII. The Ninth Circuit rejected
each of Arizona's attempts to evade the applicability of
Manhart's reasoning to its deferred compensation plan,
and upheld the relief awarded by the district court as fully
authorized by the Supreme Court's decision in
Manhart.21
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case
for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The
decision was divided into two distinct parts-liability and
relief. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion for the Court
with regard to liability. In a disconcertingly close decision, the Court held that the retirement annuity plan
discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.

20. Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm., 486 F. Supp. 645, 652
(D. Ariz. 1980), affd, Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax
Deferred Annuity, 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982), ajfd in part and rev<J
in part, 103 S.Ct., 3492 (1983).
21. Norris v. Arizona Governing Corrun., 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir.
1982).
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With regard to relief, the Court held, as expressed in an
opinion by Justice Powell, that all retirement benefits
derived from contributions made after the Court's decision must be calculated without regard to the sex of the
beneficiary. Justice O'Connor provided the swing vote by
joining Justices Marshall, Brennan, White, and Stevens
on the liability issue, but concurring with Justices
Powell, Rehnquist, Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger,
in granting significantly more limited relief than that
awarded by the courts below.
The significance of Norris to the development of Title VII analysis rests in three major areas, as discussed
in greater detail below. First, the Court reaffirmed the
principle, most clearly set forth in Manhart, that the
plan's explicit use of sex distinctions constituted unlawful
discrimination on its face. Norris leaves no doubt as to
the illegality under Title VII of explicitly sexdifferentiated employee benefits.22
Second, the Court held that the focus must always be
on the requirement of sex-neutral payments to individual
employees, and not on the employer's cost of providing
equal payments. Thus, although the employer's cost of
prividing equal fringe benefits to women (or Blacks) as
a group may be greater, once an employer chooses to
provide a particular type of fringe benefit, cost is no
defense to Title VII liability for the overt discriminatory
provision of those benefits.23
22. Proving the use of a sex-based classification establishes the
employer's intent to discriminate, thus reaching the end point of Title VII disparate treatment analysis. Compare cases of facial
discrimination, e.g., Norris, 103 S.Ct. 3492; Manhart, 435 U.S. 702;
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-33 (1977); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), with cases in which factual
issues exist as to the fact of differential treatment on the basis of sex
or race, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 255 n. 8 (1981); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 577 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).

In contrast to the intentional discrimination analysis used in
disparate treatment cases (established either through evidence of explicit sex-based treatment or through certain factual inferences and
presumptions in a pretext analysis), in disparate impact cases, plaintiffs may challenge employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than on others and cannot be justified by business
necessity. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
23. Compare the Ninth Circuit's analysis of cost defense in a
disparate impact challenge to compensation dicrimination in Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S.ct. 3544 (1984) (challenge to employee medical policy
head-of-household rule) with the Supreme Court's rejection of cost
as a defense in Manhart. As the Court recognized in Manhart, 435
U.S. at 718 n. 34, the sex composition of the workforce may be taken
into account in computing the employer's cost of providing the fringe
benefit: Title VII does not make 1t unlawful "to determine the funding requirements for an establishment's benefit plan by considering
the composition of the entire [work]force." The difference in cost of
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Third, although cost provided no justification for
discrimination, the Court held that cost constitutes a
highly relevant factor in fashioning appropriate relief for
discrimination in pension and retirement plans. Because
of the Court's concern regarding the sensitive long-term
funding assumptions involved in making pension plan
pay-outs, the Norris Court held that lower courts must
depart from the usual Title VII practice of providing
"make whole" relief where the cost of a retroactive
remedy would endanger the solvency of pension plans,
and where the employer could have believed that
Manhart did not apply. This holding is troubling in two
important respects. First, there were no findings below
regarding the total cost to Arizona of equalizing all future
benefits under the plan. The Court merely relied on
estimates regarding the high cost to state and local governments generally of retroactively equalizing benefits
under such unfunded plans.24 Second, the decision perpetuates the discrimination against women participants
in the plan until sometime in the next century, and may
encourage some employers to continue questionable pension practices until a court has held them unlawful.
A. Factual Background
Arizona established its challenged deferred compensation plan in 1974 as an optional fringe benefit to pro-

providing benefits for respective classes of employees can be taken
into account in the pay-out stage by factoring such costs into sexmerged or "unisex" tables used to compute benefits, or by requiring
employers themselves to equalize benefits paid to individual
employees.
Unisex tables have been developed for both defined benefit and
defined contribution plans. See infra notes 82-85,87 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., U. of Minnesota Adopts Unisex Plan for Pensions: Right Thing to Do, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. 25 Oct. 13,
1982, at 25; Fellers & Jackson, Non-Insured Pension Mortality: The
UP-1984 Table, Presentation at the Joint Program, Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice, Society of Actuaries 3 May 1975, at 3. The
sex-merged or composite mortality table described by Fellers and
Jackson is appropriate for valuation of pension plans covering groups
having 10-30% female employees, if used without adjustment. The
table can be set back or set forward for use with groups with a different male-female percentage.
24. See Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3510. Justice Powell relied upon
general figures in a Department of Labor Cost Study estimating the
cost of retroactive relief for all types of pension plans-public or
private, funded and unfunded. That study has been criticized as
severely overstating the costs involved, and of containing serious
technical flaws which invalidate its results. See Review ofA Report On
the Cost Study of the Impact of An Equal Benefits Rule On Pension
Benefits, Hearings on S. 372. Before the Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 98th Cong., lst Sess. (1983) (statement
ofD. Grubbs, consulting actuary). Cf Manhart, 435 U.S. at 722 n.
42 ("[W]e cannot base a ruling on the facts of this case
alone .... [E]quitable remedies may be flexible, but they still must be
founded on principle.")
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vide supplemental retirement benefits to state
employees.25 Deferred compensation plans enable
employees to defer a portion of their taxable income until
retirement, at which time they are, presumably, taxed at
a lower rate.26 Such plans, therefore, are of particular importance in recruiting and retaining senior or highly
qualified employees whose salaries place them in a
relatively high tax bracket.
Persuant to IRS guidelines, which were substantially
codified as Section 131 of the Revenue Act of 1978,27
Arizona employees were permitted to defer the payment
of income taxes not on1y on deferred wages, but also on
the interest such deferred wages earn. IRS guidelines
provide that in order to avoid the immediate recognition
of income by the employee pursuant to the "constructive
receipt" or "economic benefit" doctrines, the deferred
wages and accrued interest may not be held in a funded
or secured plan and must continue to be treated as the
property of the employer.28 Employees are permitted to
25. Arizona's Deferred Compensation Plan states its purpose as
follows:
... [T]he purpose of [the plan] is to attract and hold
certain individuals by permitting them to enter into
agreements with the Committee which will provide for
monthly payments on retirement, as well as death
benefits in the event of death before or after retirement.
Norris Joint Stipulated Statement of Facts (Joint Appendix 10), Exhibit 10, at 10; Exhibit 11, at 10.
The benefits provided under the plan did not affect the amount
of benefits an employee would receive under the state's primary
retirement plan, which were made on a sex-neutral basis. See ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-874A; Brief for Petitioners in Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris at 3 n. 4.
26. For a description of the development, characteristics, and unique tax status of state government deferred compensation plans such
as Arizona's, see H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-53
(1978), S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-65 (1978).
When an unfunded, non-qualified plan is maintained by a
governmental unit or a church, the plan may cover all or any part of
the employer's workforce. Under Title I of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, and
42 U.S.C.), other employers may maintain such plans only to provide
benefits in excess of those permitted under qualified plans, or to provide deferred compensation for a group of employees consisting
primarily of highly compensated or management employees. Id.
Tl. 26 u.s.c. § 457 (1984).
28. Unfunded, non-qualified deferred compensation plans were
first developed by private employers as a result of Rev. Ru!. 68-99,
1968-1 C.B. 193 and 72-75, 1972-1 C.B. !Tl, which discussed the applicability of the constructive receipt doctrine to such deferred compensation arrangements.
When, in 1972, the Internal Revenue Service issued its first
favorable private letter ruling authorizing a state or local government
employer to establish a non-qualified deferred compensation plan for
all or a part of its workforce, Arizona promptly enacted ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 38-871-874 (1974 & 1983 Supp.) providing for a voluntary deferred compensation plan. See ARIZ. ADMIN. COMP. R. 2-9-01
(1984).
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choose an investment vehicle for t.heir deferred wages
from among options provided by the employer, although
legal control over the deferred wages-including the legal
right to decline or accede to an employee's investment or
payout preference-continues to rest with the employer
until actual receipt by the employee. The state bore the
cost of making the necessary payroll deductions, and of
channelling those sums to the company designated by the
employee, but did not itself contribute to the amount
deferred by an employee.
Under Arizona's plan, when a participating employee reached retirement, the employee could elect to
receive the accumulated amount of deferred wages and
accrued interest over time in one of three options: 1) a
lump sum (provided on a sex-neutral basis); 2) fixed payments over a specific term ofup to 15 years (sex-neutral);
or 3) in form of a life-time annuity (sex based). Because
of the tax benefits associated with deferred compensation,29 and in the hope of providing a secure retirement
income, most employees elected the life-time annuity option, which entitles an employee to receive a monthly
payment until death .30
When Arizona invited bids from insurance companies to act as investment vehicles for its deferred compensation plan, it made no attempt to assure that the annuity payments to Arizona retirees would be nondiscriminatory.31 In fact, each of the group annuity contracts

29. Because the principle attraction of a deferred compensation
plan is tax savings, it will generally be self-defeating to elect a lump
sum payment, which would be taxed on the entire amount in a single
year. Unless an employee has only a small amount accumulated, the
election of a lump sum payment will force the employee to pay income taxes on the amount at rates at least as high (or possibly higher)
than the employee would have paid in the absence of such a plan.
30. As of August 18, 1978, a total of 1,675 employees were participants in the plan, including 681 women. Of the 681 participating
women, 572. tentatively elected an annuity option. As of the same
date, 10 women had retired, with 4 electing a life-time annuity
payout. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3495.
31. The state's contract procurement documents asked the bidders
to quote annuity rates for men and women. 103 S.Ct. at 3501 n. 19.
32. As the Court noted, the insurance companies participating in
the plan used different means of classifying individuals on the basis
of sex. Several of the companies used separate male and female actuarial tables. Another company used a single table based on male
mortality rates, but applied a six year "set back" for women, i.e., by
treating a woman as if she were a man six years younger and had the
life expectancy of a man that age. 103 S.Ct. at 3495 n. 2.
The history and use of sex-based mortality tables is described in
Note, Challenges to Sex-Based Monality Tables in Insurance and
Pensions, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 59 (1979-80). The first separate
women's mortality tables were deployed in England in the late 1700's,
but were never widely adopted. In the early 1900's in the United
States, women had trouble getting any kind of insurance, based on insurance companies' misconceptions about increased female mortality
due to child birth hazards, although a 1916 study reported that women
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entered into by the state under the deferred compensation
plan provided for calculation of benefits pursuant to sexbased actuarial tables, resulting in lower monthly
payments to individual women than to individual men
who had deferred the identical amounts of income.32 Sex
was the only factor that the actuarial tables used to
classify individuals of the same age; the tables did not inhad a 12 % lower mortality rate overall, and a T/% lower rate between
the ages of 25 and 34. Id. at 60-61. It was not until the 1950's,
however, that insurance companies began charging women lower
rates for life insurance based on lower mortality of women as a group.
Id. at 61.
Today a number of separate sex-based tables have been compiled
for different types of insurance, such as individual life insurance,
group life insurance, individual annuities, group annuities (pensions),
and industrial life insurance. Id. at 61-62. nn. 31-35. Some of these
tables are based on mortality data more than twenty years old while
others are more up to date. Even where unisex tables have been used, they have not been used consistently. As Ms. Blevins observed in
her Note, "In group life insurance, where women would benefit if
sex-based mortality tables are used, unisex tables are used and
women pay higher premiums. In group annuities where men benefit
from sex-based mortality tables, sex-based tables are used. Hence
women pay more than the insurance is worth in both areas." Id. at 64.
Such discriminatory inconsistencies, formerly found fairly frequently
in employee benefit plans, are unlawful under Title VII.
Although insurance companies have discontinued the use of exlicit racial classifications in setting rates and benefits, they steadfastly
maintain the practice of using sex-based classifications. Higher life
insurance rates for blacks, once the custom, were also justified by insurance companies as "dictated entirely by actuarial findings." M.
JAMES, THE METROPOLITAN. LIFE: A STUDY IN BUSINESS GROWTH
338 (1947). See also, e.g.' G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA:
THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 316-17, 955,
1262-63 (1944) (history of differential treatment accorded blacks by
white insurance companies); M.S. STUARf, AN ECONOMIC DETOUR:
A HISTORY OF INSURANCE IN THE LIVES OF AMERICAN NEGROES
(1940); C. G. WOODSON, Insurance Business Among Negroes, in
THE NEGRO As A BUSINESSMAN (1929 & reprint 1969) (development of black insurance companies); G. STEPHENSON, RACE
DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 138-140 (1910); Fellers & Jackson,
Non-Insured Pension Monality: The UP-1984 Table, SOC'Y OF Ac.
TUARIES 3 (May 1975)(Presentation at the Joint Program, Conference
of Actuaries in Public Practice); Note, The Constitutionality of Racial
Classifications in Monality Tables, 11 RUTGERS L. REv. 757 (1956).
Risk classifications based on race (or religion) are now generally rejected as contrary to public policy. See Lange v. Rancher, 262 Wis.
625, 56 N .W.2d 542 (1953) (state insurance commissioner may not
bar blacks from state insurance program simply because statistics
show that blacks as a group have a lower life expectancy); J.
GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 87 (1959)
(discussion of state statutes prohibiting race dicrimination by insurance companies).
Compare, e.g., California Insurance Code §10140, prohibiting
life or disability insurers from discriminating on the basis of race,
religion, or national origin in the issuance of policies or in setting
premiums for such insurance, with California Insurance Code
§790.03 (f), which requires "differentials based upon the sex of the
individual insured or annuitant in rates or dividends or benefits" for
"any contract of ordinary life insurance or indivudual life annuity applied for and issued on or after January 1, 1981." See note 61, infra
for discussion of a California amendment bringing its law into compliance with Norris.
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corporate other factors that correlate with longevity.
Thus, despite the fact that 84 percent of women as a
group will not live longer than their male counterparts,3 3
all individual women were to receive lower monthly annuity payments than identically situated men, solely
because of their sex.
Nathalie Norris, an employee in Arizona's Department of Economic Security, elected in 1975 to participate
in the plan. She requested that her deferred compensation in the amount of $199.50 per month be invested in
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company's fixed annuity contract. After exhausting administrative remedies,
Norris brought suit against the state, the plan's governing committee, and several individual members of the
committee, claiming that the defendants were violating
Title VII by offering an annuity plan which provided sex
discriminatory benefits. She represented a certified class
consisting of all female employees of the state "who
enrolled or will in the future enroll in the State Deferred
Compensation Plan."3 4
3~. See Norris, 671 F.2d 332 n.l; Bergmann & Gray, Equality in
Retirement Benefits, 8 Crv. RTS. Dro. 25-29 (1975).
34. 103 S.Ct. at 3495.
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B. The Shifting Alliances of the Norris Court

1. Liability
The Court's holding on the issue of Title VII liability
constitutes a reaffirmation of the analysis applied in
Manhart. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority on
liability, considered first whether the state would have
violated Title VII "if they had run the entire deferred
compensation plan themselves, without the participation
of any insurance companies." 35 Based upon the reasoning
of Manhart, the Court beld in Norris that the "classification of employees on the basis of sex is no more permissible at the pay-out stage of a retirement plan than the
pay-in stage." 36 The Court reiterated the basic teaching
of Manhart: "that Title VII requires employers to treat
their employees as individuals, not 'as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class;' 37
Justice Marshall emphasized that Manhart "squarely rejected the notion that, because women as a class live
longer than men, an employer may adopt a retirement
35. 103 S.Ct. at 3496.
36. 103 S.Ct. at 3497.
37. 103 S.Ct. at 3498, quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708.
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plan that treats every individual woman less favorably
than every individual man." 38 He then applied the same
principles to the facts of Norris, and found the Arizona
plan to be discriminatory on its face.
In so holding, the majority rejected Arizona's argument that the plan did not discriminate on the basis of sex
because similarly situated men and women would obtain
annuity policies at retirement with equal present actuarial
values.39 Justice Marshall exposed the underlying fallacy
of such an argument to be the mistaken assumption that
Title VII permits the use of a sex-based classification in
predicting longevity. Without use of the sex-based
classification in the first place, there would be no basis
for postulating the actuarial equivalence.4 Consistent

°

38. Id.
39. Present actuarial value is determined by multiplying the monthly value of the annuity by the life-expectancy (from an actuarial table)
of the beneficiary. See Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3497 n.11. For example,
Norris, with a life expectancy of 79 years, would receive a total of
$53,890.93 paid out as $320.11/month over her expected life span of
14 years after her retirement at age 65. A man would also receive a
total of $53,890.93, but he would be paid $354.06 per month over his
expected life span of 12.7 years after his retirement at age 65. See
Joint Stipulated Statement of Facts, Joint Appendix at 12, Norris.
40. 103 S.Ct. at 3498. Actuarial "equality" by definition depends
upon the classifications used to determine values. As explained in
Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock, & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in
. Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic
Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 505, 512 (1980), it is circular to use the
expectancies generated by a predictor to justify using that predictor.
This may be illustrated by a simple example.
Consider the life expectancy of a newborn black male in South
Carolina. Prediction of his life expectancy may or may not take into account his sex, race, and residence. If he is classified as a nonwhite male from South Carolina, his lifo expectancy is 58.33 years.
Ifhe is classified simply as a resident of the United States, his life expectancy is 70.75 years. The other possibilities range in between; he
may be a non-white South Carolinian [62.64), a male South Carolinian [63.85), a non-white male American [60.98), a male American
[67.04), a non-white American [64.95), or a South Carolinian
[67. 96]. He has eight different life expectancies-and just on the basis
of the three predictors introduced so far. Thus, the argument that sexbased actuarial tables are not discriminatory because they are "true"
proves far too much, since it is virtually certain that every person
covered can point to characteristics which actuarially demand lower
(and higher) benefits simultaneously.
Moreover, there is substantial debate over whether sex constitutes a valid proxy for longevity. Compare id. at 539-59; Brilmayer,
Laycock, & Sullivan, The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Benston, 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 222, 236-47 (1983); with Benston, Discrimination and
&onomic Efficiency in Employee Fringe Benefits; A Clarification of
Issues and a Response to Professors Brilmayer, Laycock, and
Sullivan, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 250, 771-73 (1983); Benston, The
&onomics of Gender Discrimination in Employee Fringe Benefits:
Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 489, 512-532 (1982). The
continuing validity of the Court's decision in Norris, does not depend
on the outcome of this debate, however. The Court held that "[t]he
use of sex-segregated actuarial tables to calculate retirement benefits
. violates Title VIl whether or not the tables reflect an accurate predic-
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with its decision in Connecticut v. Teal, in which the
Court rejected the so-called "bottom line" defense,41 the
majority in Norris refused to accept Justice Powell's
dissenting view that a neutral overall impact on the group
justifies a policy that discriminates against individuals.42
In exposing the fallacy of the actuarial equivalence
argument, Justice Marshall relied upon Manhart's
analogy to the use of race-based actuarial tables. The
Court observed in Manhart that Title VII could not
reasonably be construed to permit such a racial
classification, even though actuarial studies could unquestionably identify differences in life expectancy based
on race as well as sex.43 In Norris, Justice Marshall
reiterated the principle that under Title VII, a "distinction based on sex stands on the same footing as a distinction based on race unless it falls within one of a few narrow exceptions that are plainly inapplicable here." 44
In deeming any exceptions inapplicable, the majori. ty's decision, consistent with its prior decisions, identified and rejected the applicable defenses to cases of

tion of the longevity of women as a class, for under the statute '[e]ven
a true generalization about [a] class' cannot justify class-based treatment." 103 S.Ct. at 3498.
41. In Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 445-56 (1982), the Court
held 5-4 (Justice's Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor and Chief Justice
Burger, dissenting) that Title VIl provides a cause of action to an individual denied promotion because of an employment test that has a
discriminatory impact on a racial group even if the class of which he
is a member has not been disproportionately denied promotion.
42. For a discussion of the Norris majority opinion as a rejection
of Justice Powell's attempt to import equal protection standards into Title VIl jurisprudence, see The Supreme Court, 1982 Tenn, 97
HARV. L. REv. 4, 252-56 (1983) ("By refusing to accept justifications
that are characteristic of equal protection jurisprudence, the Court
reiterated its determination to prohibit facial discrimination in Title
vrr cases.").
43. 435 U.S. at 709. See supra note 32.
44. 103 S. Ct. at 3498. Some of Arizona's supporting amici argued
in Norris that race should be treated differently from sex for annuity purposes. Title VII forbids such a distinction. In 1972, Congress
reaffirmed the remedial goals of both the race and sex discrimination
provisions when it added enforcement provisions and expanded Title VIl coverage to include state and local government employees. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) and (t)(l982). In explaining the necessity for the
1972 Amendments, the House Committee on Education and Labor
observed that "discrimination against women continues to be
widespread and is regarded by many as morally or physiologically
justifiable." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971) reprinted
in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2141. The Committee then
specifically rejected the notion that sex discrimination is less serious
than other forms of employment discrimination:
This Committee believes that women's rights are not
judicial divertissements. Discrimination against women
is no less serious than other forms of prohibited
employment practices and is to be accorded the same
degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful
discrimination [emphasis added].
Id .
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facial sex-based classifications and overt compensation
discrimination. The Court briskly rejected the exception
for bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQ) 45
"because the terms of a retirement plan have nothing to
do with occupational qualifications." It also rejected the
"any other factor than sex" exception recognized in the
Bennett Amendment, 46 for the same reason it was inapplicable in Manhart: a scheme that uses sex to predict
longevity is based on sex; it is not based on "any other
factor than sex." 47 Thus, the Court rejected any applicable defense to a facial showing of sex discrimination.
Significantly, the Court also reaffirmed its holding
in Manhart "that the greater cost of providing retirement
benefits for women as a class cannot justify differential
treatment based on sex." 48 The court noted that the postManhart enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978 (PDA), in which Congress amended Title VII to
establish that "the terms 'because of sex' or on the 'basis

45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). The BFOQ defense, an extremely narrow exception, is applicable in cases challenging the use of overt sexbased classifications in hiring and certain employment practices, and
by its terms is not available as a justification for discriminatory compensation practices. Under the BFOQ defense, the employer must
prove that there is a factual basis for believing that "all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the
duties of the job involved," or that "the essence of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977); see also
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
46. The Bennett Amendment, found in Section 703 (h) of Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), provides that Title VII does not prohibit an
employer from differentiating upon the basis of sex in determining the
amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees
of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by [the Equal
Pay Act]. The Court has construed the Bennett Amendment as incorporating the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into
Titles VII. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l976), provides in pertinent part as follows:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any
establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages
to employees in such establishment at a rate less than
the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs
the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under
similar working conditions, except where such payment
is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential
based on any other factor other than sex: Provided,
That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to
comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce
the wage rate of any employee.
47. 103 S. Ct. at 3498, n.13.
48. See 103 S. Ct. at 3498, n.14.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER [Vol. 8: 3 (1985)]

of sex' include ... pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions," 49 buttresses its prior holding. In
enacting the PDA, Congress was aware that requiring
employers to cover pregnancy on the same basis "as
other disabilities would add approximately $200 million
to their total cost, but concluded that the PDA was
necessary to clarify the original intent of Title VII." 50
After concluding that Arizona would have violated
Title VII if it had run the entire plan itself, the majority
turned to the second part of its analysis on the liability
issue: is the employer's conduct "beyond the reach of the
statute because it is the companies chosen by [the
employer] to participate in the plan that calculate and pay
the retirement benefits?" 51 Under Arizona's view, it acted
as a mere "passive conduit" transmitting employee funds
to employee-selected investment vehicles, and bore no
legal responsibility for the differential in payments
ultimately received by its female employees. Arizona
thus attempted to shift responsibility to the life insurance
companies which it chose as funding media for its deferred compensation plan.52
In Manhart, the Court had noted that Title VII
"primarily govern[s] the relationship between employees
and their employer, not between employees and third
parties." 53 Relying upon this limitation on the reach of
Title VII, and the so called "open market" exception
recognized in Manhart ,54 Arizona argued in Norris that
it could not be held liable for the practices of insurance
companies. The State maintained that the array of annuities offered by the companies participating in the plan
merely reflected what was then available on the open
market. The State also argued that the availability of a
lump sum payment upon retirement, which could be
used to purchase annuities on the open market, also
brought its plan within Manhart's "open market exception." The majority dismissed these arguments, and emphasized that an employer which offers one fringe benefit
on a discriminatory basis, even if through a third party,
cannot escape liability because other benefits are offered
49. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92
Stat. 2fJ/6, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
50. 103 S. Ct. at 3499, n.14. See Newport News Shipbuilding and
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, _ _u.s. __ , 103 s. Ct. 2622 (1983).
51. 103 S. Ct. at 3499.
52. 103 S. Ct. at 3499-3501.
53. 435 U.S. at 718 n.33.
54. As the Court observed in Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717-18,
Nothing in our holding implies that it would be
unlawful for an employer to set aside equal retirement
contributions for each employee and let each retiree
purchase the largest benefits which his or her accumulated contribution could command in the open
market.
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on a non-discriminatory basis. Moreover, the majority
emphasized that the marketplace could not define the
lawfulness of an employer's fringe benefit plan. The
Court stated:
It would be inconsistent with the broad
remedial purposes of Title VII to hold that an
employer who adopts a discriminatory fringe
benefit plan can avoid liability on the ground
that he (sic) could not find a third party willing
to treat his employees on a nondiscriminatory
basis. An employer who confronts such a situation must either supply the fringe benefit himself, without the assistance of any third party or
not provide it at all." 55 (Footnotes omitted.)
Thus, the Court concluded that because the retirement benefits clearly constituted an aspect of the employment relationship, it made no difference that the
employer engaged tbird ~arties to provide the particular
benefit rather than directly providing for the benefits
itself. The employer must be held fully responsible under
Title VII for its discriminatory fringe-benefit programs.
In his dissent, Justice Powell relied on the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.56 The majority also addressed
the argument that the State's plan was exempted from the
reach of Title VII by the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
although the argument had been abandoned by Arizona
after its rejection below by the Ninth Circuit. In a footnote added "to lay the matter to rest," Justice Marshall
explained that by its own terms, the McCarran-Ferguson
Act applies only to the business of insurance and has no
application to employment practices.57
Justice Marshall first pointed out that no insurance
company had been joined as a defendant, and that the
Court's judgment would not preclude any insurance
company from offering sex-based annuity benefits.58 He

55. 103 S. Ct. 3502.
56. § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)(l982). lbe McCarran-Ferguson Act
provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance ...."
57. 103 S. Ct. at 3500 n.17.
58. In litigation involving sex distinct retirement benefits provided
through the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association and College
Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), an insurance company
created as an educational service organizing for the purpose of providing annuity benefits for college and university employees, TIAACREF has been joined as a co-defendant in lawsuits against colleges
and universities as an "employer" or agent of an employer within the
meaning of Title VII. See Spirt v. TIAA, 691 F.2d at 1063 (TIAACREF held to be an employer for the purposes of Title VII); but see
Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 476 F. Supp. 1343, 1351 (E.D. Mich.
Im) (TIAA-CREF held an employer), i-ev'd, 691 F.2d at 238 (TIAA• CREF held not to be an employer under Title VII). TIAA-CREF can
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then observed that the State itself was not engaged in the
business of insurance because it had not underwritten
any risks.59 Accordingly, application of Title VII would
not supersede the application of any state law regulating
"the business of insurance." Because that conclusion
disposed of the issue, the Court did not decide whether
"Title VII specifically relates to the business of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.60 To summarize, the majority rejected Justice
Powell's conclusion that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
precludes application of Title VII where state insurance
laws permit insurance companies to sell sex-distinct annuities to employee benefit plans.61
therefore be distinguished from the independent third party insurance
companies participating in the plan at issue in Norris. See also Hannahs v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 26 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 527, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
59. For cases defining the "business of insurance" under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act as involving some investment risk-taking,
see Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, (1982); Group
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 221 (1979);
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 69 (1959).
The Court's conclusion in Norris, that the state in providing an
employee benefit plan was not engaged in the "business of insurance," is also fully consistent with the federal regulatory scheme,
applied to most employee pension benefit plans in the private sector,
which was created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (19 ). Under ERISA, an
employer's choice of an insurance contract as a funding mechanism
for its employee benefit plan does not alter its identity as an employee
benefit plan subject to the Act's requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)
(definition of employee welfare benefit plan); § 1002(2) (definition
of employee pension benefit plan). Moreover, in the so-called
"deemer clause," ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(B)(
), provides that
employee benefit plans are not the "business of insurance" for purposes of state regulations. Consistent with the "deemer clause,"
ERISA establishes the regulation of employee pension benefit plans
"as exclusively a federal concern." Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981); see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 103
S.Ct. 2890, (1983) (state law prohibiting pregnancy discrimination is
preempted with respect to ERISA covered benefit plans only insofar
as it prohibits practices that are lawful under Title VII). Although
ERISA contains no non-discrimination provision, Congress
understood and intended in enacting ERISA that Title VII's nondiscrimination requirements applied, and would continue to apply to
employee pension plans. See legislative History of the Employment
Income Security Act at 1862, 3518-19 (1976).
60. See the excellent discussion of McCarran-Ferguson Act issue
in Spirt v. TIAA, 691 F.2d at 1063-1066; see also Women in City
Gov't United v. City of New York, 515 F. Supp. at 302-06.
61. Virtually all states permit insurance companies to sell sexdistinct annuity policies. In April 1983, Montana enacted the first
state statute, H.B. No. 358, effective in 1985, which would prohibit
the sale of such sex-based policies. Under the new Montana law, it
will be an "unlawful discriminatory practice for any financial insitution or person to discriminate solely on the basis of sex or marital
status in the issuance or operation of any type of insurance policy,
plan, or coverage or in any pension or retirement plan, program, or
coverage, including discrimination in regard to rates or premiums and
payments or benefits." See Act of Apr. 15, 1983, ch. 531, 1983 Mont.
Laws 1220 (to be codified at MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 49, ch. 2, pt. 3)
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2. Relief
Writing for a different majority on the issue of relief,
Justice Powell held that the retroactive portion of the
relief ordered by the district court was "unprecedented
(eff. Oct. 1, 1985). Bills have been introduced in the 1985 Montana
legislative session to substantially amend or repeal the statute. In addition, five states, Michigan, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Hawaii,
and Pennsylvania, specifically prohibit (by statute or regulation) sex
discrimination in rates or premiums for auto insurance. See generally,
R. Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 517, 528-33 (1983); Note, A Step Toward Insurance Equity:
Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J.
251, 263 (1984).
As noted in Justice Powell's opinion, 103 S.Ct. at 3506 n. 3, at
the time of the Norris decision, California required the use of differentials based on the sex of the individual insured in the sale of ordinary life insurance and individual life annuities where they are
"substantially supported by valid pertinent data segregated by sex."
See CAL. INS. CODE§ 790.03(t) (West Supp. 1985). That provision
was amended with regard to employment-related policies in
September 1983, however, to comport with the Court's decision in
Norris, S.B. No. 960, Section 2, Stat. 1983, Ch. 1261. Section
790.03(t) now provides that "sex-based differentials in rates or
dividends or benefits, or any combination thereof, shall not be required for ... any contract of life insurance or life annuity issued pursuant to arrangements which may be considered terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment as such terms are used in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended."
Proposed federal legislation which would ban discrimination
based on race, religion, national origin, or sex in the writing or selling of insurance has been under consideration for several sessions.
See Note, Ending Sex Discrimination in Insurance: The Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act, II J. LEGJS 457 (1984). There is no
question that Congress may enact laws regulating the business of insurance as a regulation of Commerce. See United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). If enacted, insurance companies would be prohibited from selling policies with sexdifferentiated rates or benefits.
The Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act (H.R. 100, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess.) introduced by Representative Dingell and numerous cosponsors, was reported out of subcommittee without amendment, on·
April 20, 1983. The Fair Insurance Practices Act (S. 'J72, 98th Cong.,
lst Sess. (1983)), virtually identical to H.R. 100, was introduced by
Senators Hatfield, Packwood, and Hollings, and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, chaired by
Senator Packwood. The same bill had been reported favorably by the
Commerce Committee just before the 97th Congress, 2nd Sess. adjourned in 1982 (then known as S. 2204). See S. REP. No. 671, 97th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982). The Commerce Committee held hearings
on S. 'J72 in the Spring of 1983. A compromise version of the bill was
close to resolution, but progress halted when the insurance industry
representatives reversed their position, pulled out of all negotiations,
and mounted a well-financed campaign against legislation. See, e.g.,
The Committee: The &ttle Over Unisex Insurance, Washington Post,
July 18, 1983, at A-1. The following year, H.R. 100 was amended
beyond recognition by the full House Committee on Energy and
Commerce. As amended, the bill lost the support of women's groups
and civil rights organizations, and no further action was taken during the remainder of the 98th Congress. Supporters of the legislation
plan to renew their efforts in the 99th Congress. See Gray & Shtasel,
Insurers Are Surviving Without Sex, 71 A.B.A.J. 89-91 (Feb. 1985).
In the meantime, non-employment related sex-based insurance
purchased on the open market can only be challenged under existing

and manifestly unjust." 62 Although the district court had
not ordered back payments, the Supreme Court viewed
a portion of the future benefit payments as fundamentally
retroactive in nature because they were based on contributions made prior to the court's decision.63 Under
Arizona's deferred compensation plan, annuity payments
to retirees were based entirely on the employee's past
contributions and any return earned on those contributions. As Justice Powell noted, in order to provide all
women (present and future retirees) with the higher level
of benefits, Arizona would be required to fund retroactively any deficiency in past contributions made by its
women retirees.64
In reaching the decision that the relief granted by the
Court should be prospective only, Justice Powell acknowledged that retroactive relief is normally appropriate in the typical Title VII case. Nevertheless, he rejected
such relief in this case, relying on the following two factors, first applied in Manhart: 1) that the employer may
well have assumed the pension plan was lawful; and 2)
that imposing such unanticipated costs on the plan could
jeopardize its solvency and the employees' benefits. First,
Justice Powell concluded that Arizona reasonably could
have assumed, based on Manhart's explicit "open

non-Title VII theories. See, e.g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (appeal pending)
(use of sex-based actuarial tables by IRS for valuation purposes prohibited under Fifth Amendment); Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 65 Pa. Commw. 249, 442 A.2d 382 (1982),
a.ffd,__A.2d. _ _ _(l984) (insurance commissioner correctly ruled that sex-based auto insurance rates constitute "unfair discrimination" among policy-holders in view of public policy against sex
discrimination expressed by state ERA); National Org. for Women
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 84 (D.C. Superior
Court) (case filed in August 1984, challenging sex-based health insurance rates as a violation of District of Columbia public accommodations law, D.C. Code§ 1-2501 et seq.); but cf., Life Ins. Co. of
North America v. Reinhardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979), on remand, 485 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (state action not established in Fourteenth Amendment claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Murphy v. Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co., 282 Pa. Super 244, 442
A.2d 1097 (1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981) (state action not
established for auto insurance company's rate structure). See generally, Comment, Insurance as a Public Accommodation: Challenging
Gender-Based Actuarial Tables at the State Level, 15 COL. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 227 (1984).
62. 103 S. Ct. at 3509.
63. Justice Marshall, dissenting in part, agreed with Justice Powell
that when a court "directs a change in benefits based on contributions
made before the court's order, the court is awarding relief which is
fundamentally retroactive in nature." That is the case, Justice Marshall pointed out, because the retirement benefits under Arizona's
plan "represent a return on contributions made during the employee's
working years and which were intended to fund the benefits without
any additional contributions from any source after retirement." 103
S. Ct. at 3503.
64. 103 S. Ct. at 3509-10, n.10.
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market" limitation, that "it would be lawful to make
available to its employees annuities offered by insurance
companies on the open market." 65 Second, he concluded
that the "devastating" cost of complying with an unanticipated retroactive order would fall on the state of
Arizona, and presumably other state and local governments, at "a time when many states and local governments are struggling to meet substantial fiscal deficits."
In sum, Justice Powell could find "no justification for
this Court, particularly in view of the question left open
in Manhart, to impose this magnitude of burden retroactively on the public." 66 The Court accordingly held that
only benefits derived from contributions collected after
the effective date of the Norris judginent, August 3, 1983,
need be calculated without regard to the sex of the
employee.
The practical effect of the Court's decision for
members of the certified class in Norris can be outlined
as follows: 1) retirees-women who retired prior to the
effective date of the Court's judgment will receive the
lower sex-based benefits for the rest of their lives; 2)
present employees-employees who retire sometime
after August 1, 1983 will receive a combination of sexbased benefits (derived from their pre-Norris contributions) and sex-neutral benefits (derived from their postNorris contributions); 67 3) future employees-only those
women retiring sometime in the distant future, whose
benefits are based entirely on contributions made after
August 1, 1983, will receive the full benefit of the Court's
ruling.

65. 103 S. Ct. at 3510.
66. Id. Most private pension plans must comply with federallymandated pension plan funding requirements under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which was enacted
to protect employees' retirement benefit expectations. 29 U.S.C. §
1081-86. See supra note 57. Plans made available to state and local
government employees, on the other hand, are exempt from ERISA's
requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (32), 1003(b)(l). Some state and
local governmental plans are not even fully funded, and pay retirement benefits through periodic appropriations. In enacting ERISA,
Congress determined that it would not a1tempt the restructuring of
state and local governmental plans through federal regulation. See
discussion of governmental plan exception in ERISA legislative
history, H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639-48; H. R. REP. No. 807.
93rd Cong.' 2d Sess reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4670-4756.
67. In fact, actions subsequently taken by Arizona have resulted in
equalized benefits for present as well as future employees. As noted
by Justice Powell, Arizona discontinued the life annuity option after
the district court ruled it violated Title VII. 103 S. Ct. at 3495 n.4.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Norris, however, Arizona
reinstituted the life annuity option retroactice to the date of the district
court's decision. In addition, the state adopted a non-discriminatory
life annuity option for all contributions inade after August 1, 1983.
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In her concurring opm1on, Justice O'Connor
reached the same result, but applied a slightly different
analysis. She examined three criteria for determining
when to apply a decision of statutory interpretation prospectively: 1) whether the decision established a new
principle of law, either by overruling past precedent or by
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution
was not clearly foreshadowed; 2) whether retroactivity
will further or retard the operation of the statute; and 3)
whether retroactive application would impose inequitable
results.68 In Justice O'Connor's view, the third criterion
was determinative and compelled a prospective decision
under the circumstances of the case. The first two criteria, under her analysis, would have permitted, but did
not require, retroactive application.
In examining the equities,69 Justice O'Connor emphasized that "[m]any working men and women have
based their retirement decisions on expectations of acertain stream of income during retirement," and that
"[t]hese decisions depend on the existence of adequate
reserves to fund these pensions." If a fund cannot meet
its obligations, " '[t]he harm would fall in large part on
innocent third parties.' " 70 Thus, Justice O'Connor based
her decision for prospective relief on the "real danger of
bankrupting pension funds."
In contrast, dissenting Justices Marshall, Brennan,
White, and Stevens emphasized that one of the main purposes of Title VII is "to make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination ."71 With regard to benefits attributable to contributions made after Manhart, these Justices found "no
special circumstances justifying denial of retroactive
relief." 72 In addition, the dissenters concluded that
benefits based on contributions made prior to Manhart

Because Norris transferred her contributions originally invested in a
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company fixed life annuity to
another company after August 1, 1983, she will retire with benefits
totally equal to her male counterparts. Letter from Amy Gittler,
counsel for plaintiffs in Norris, dated February 28, 1984 (on file with
Ubmens Rights Law Reponer). See also discussion infra notes 98-103
and accompanying text regarding conversion theories.
68. 103 S. Ct. at 3512, relying on the criteria set forth in Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
69. A court that finds unlawful discrimination under Title VII
"[m]ay enjoin [the discrimination] ... and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement ... with or without back pay ... or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). See
generally Manhan, 435 U.S. at 718-23; Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 442 U.S. 405 (1975).
70. 103 S.Ct. at 3512, quoting Manhan, 435 U.S. at 722-23.
71. 103 S.Ct. at 3502, quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 442
U.S. at 418.
72. 103 S.Ct. at 3503.
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should be equalized if the employer could have used sexneutral tables after the previous decision without
violating any contract provisions. They would have had
the district court consider on remand whether "some or
all of the male participants in the plan who had not
retired at the time Manhart was decided had any contractual right to a particular level of benefits that would have
been impaired by the application of sex-neutral tables to
their pre-Manhart contributions." 73
III. EMPLOYEE PENSION AND ANNUITY
PLANS - RECOGNIZING EMPLOYER
NON-COMPLIANCE
A basic familiarity with pension and retirement
plans makes it much easier to uncover employer noncompliance with Norris. In general, pension plans can
be divided into two broad categories: 1) defined benefit
plans and 2) defined contribution plans.74 Alt)10ugh
typical trouble spots for sex differentials depend on the
basic type of plan, the problem comes from the same
73. 103 S.Ct. at 3504.
74. See generally, e.g .• U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, COST STUDY
OF THE IMPACT OF AN EQUAL BENEFITS RULE ON PENSION BENEFITS
(Jan. 1983) [hereinafter cited as U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, COST STUDY];
A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS (1982) at App.
B; E. ALLEN, E; J. MELONE & J. ROSENBLOOM, PENSION PLANNING:
PENSIONS, PROFITS-SHARING AND OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION
PLANS 20-65 (3d ed. 1976); D. McGILL, Actuarial Cost factors in
FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 305-31 (3d ed. 1975).
The majority of covered workers are in defined benefit plans. According· to the U.S. Department of Labor, approximately 65 % of the
42.5 million active private pension plan participants in 1977 were
covered by defined benefit plans; the remaining 35 % were covered
by defined contribution plans. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, COST STUDY,
supra, at 8-9. The majority of plans, however, are structured as defined contribution plans. Defined contribution plans accounted for 71 %
of the estimated 451,761 private pension plans in operation in 1977,
while 29% were defined benefit plans.
Despite their greater number, defined contribution plans tend to
be smaller in size, and the vast majority are supplemental in nature.
Only about three million workers have them as their primary plan.
Id. at 9. A substantial number of college and university employees
have as their primary plan a defined contribution plan provided
through TIAA-CREF (Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association
and College Retirement Equities Fund), which covers over 700,000
participants in over 3500 institutions nationwide. See 1981 TIAACREF Annual Report at 5. In the public sector, only 2 % of the state
and local employees are covered exclusively by defined contribution
plans.
Approximately 16% of covered state and local workers are in
combination plans having both defined contribution and defined
benefit features. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, COST STUDY, supra note 74 at
56 n. 47. The rest are defined benefit plans. The Department of Labor
estimates that as many as two-fifths of covered employees may participate in more than one employee retirement plan. Typically, such
employees would be covered by a basic defined plan plus a supplemental defined contribution plan, such as a profit sharing or deferred compensation plan. Id. at 9 n. 5.

source: the use of sex-based mortality tables to calculate
the actuarial value of an amount accumulated or received
by employees under the plan.
A. Defined Benefit Plans
Defined benefits plans provide for payment of
specified amount of benefits upon retirement, typically
based upon a wage and length of service formula. A
commonly used formula for computing the amount of an
employee's pension benefits multiplies a percentage of
pay over the last five years of work by the number uf
years the employee has been covered. Other common
formulas apply a flatdollar amount for each year covered
by the plan, or pay retirees a specified flat percentage of
their earnings, regardless of their length of service.
Employee and employer contribution rates, on the
other hand, are actuarily determined, based on predicted
benefits payable in the future. Actuarial valuations used
to determine contribution rates depend upon estimates of
myriad cost factors, including 1) the characteristics of a
plan population; 2) interest rate assumptions, and 3) expenses.75 The plan population and its characteristics are
determined by the flow of participants into and out of the
plan (new employees, retirements, terminations, de~th,
and disability). Traditional plan population cost factors
include the number of participants and beneficiaries, the
male and female mix, the attained age distribution, the
distribution by years of service, and the level and
distributions of salaries (if the benefits of the plan are
related to compensation).7 6
Interest rate assumptions used in the actuarial valuation formula greatly affect estimates of plan costs and
liabilities because of the long time span between benefit
accruals and payments. As a generalization, it has been
observed that a change of 1% in the interest rate assumption alters the long-run cost estimate of a typical plan by
about 25 %.77 For this reason, it is common practice to
use an interest rate assumption lower than the expected
long-term rate of return, leading to overstatement of the
expected cost of the plan.7 8 Thus, the interest assumption
used by a plan significantly affects the actuarial valuation
(more so than the sex mix of the plan population), and
the corresponding funding requirements for the plan.
The pension plan at issue in Manhart was a defined
benefit plan. In defined benefit pla:ns, the trouble spots
for sex discrimination are found at the pay-in stage in.
75. See D. MCGILL, Actuarial Cost Factors:in FUNDAMENTALS OF
PRIVATE PENSIONS 305-31 (1975).
76. Id. at 307-08.
77. Id. at 324.
78. Id. at 325.

169

Heen/SEX DISCRIMINATION IN PENSIONS AFTER NORRIS

employee contribution rates and in the pay-out stage
where optional benefits are based on the actuarial value
of the normal benefits.7 9 Discriminatory contribution
rates have largely been eliminated in the wake of
Manhart. However, discriminatory pay-out options remain a problem in numerous plans. In defined benefit
plans, normal benefits are computed according to sexneutral formulas as described above. Similarly situated
men and women choosing a "normal benefit" receive
equal amounts. Similarly situated men and women
choosing an optional benefit, however, receive sexdifferentiated benefits if the conversion is made with sexbased actuarial tables. Under typical alternative pay-out
options, i.e. , early retirement options, lump sum
payments or joint and survivor benefits, the use of sexbased actuarial tables results in individual men receiving lower benefits than similarly situated women.
For example, if an identically situated male and
female were to retire at age sixty-five with a yearly "normal" retirement benefit of $5,000, the respective present
actuarial values of their benefits, based on sex-based
mortality tables predicting eighteen or more years of life
for the average man, and twenty-two for the average
woman, would be $90,000 for the man ($5,000 x 18 =
$90,000) and $110,000 for the woman ($5,000 x 22 =
$110,000). The same present actuarial values would apply
in computing lump sum payment'i ($90,000 and $110,000)
or for calculating joint and survivor options, where the
retired employee receives a specified periodic amount for
life, and the surviving spouse thereafter receives a
periodic benefit for his or her life.so The actuarial
equivalent for early retirement for each at age sixty-two,
still based on sex-based mortality tables, would then be
$4,285 for the man ($90,000 ...;- 21 [18 + 3] = $4,285),
and $4,400 for the woman ($110,000 ...;- 25 [22 + 3] =
$4,400). If a merged mortality table were used for both
sexes, the present actuarial value of the man's and

79. Normal benefits are those benefits automatically provided
under the plan.
80. Joint and survivor annuity periodic payments also tend to be
smaller for individual men than for sirnilarily situated women based
on the actuarial determination that men are more likely to be survived
by their wives than vice versa. Smaller payments for men choosing
the joint and survivor option are exac€,:rbated by the assumption that
the man's spouse is likely to outlive him not only because of her sex
but also because it is likely that she is younger than her husband.
ERISA requires covered pension plans to provide employees with a
joint and survivor pay-out option. Currently, approximately 35% of
married men in defined benefit plans select the joint and survivor option. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, COST STUDY, supra note 74 at 78. In
contrast, lump sum pay-out options are not required by ERISA and
are relatively rare in defined benefit plans. They accounted for about
2 % of male recipients who retired in 1978.

woman's retirement at age sixty-five would be equal (i.e.,
$5,000 x 20 years = $100,000), and similarly, the actuarial equivalent for early retirement at age sixty-two
would yield equal payments ($100,000 ...;- 23 = $4,348).s 1
Fifty-five percent of private defined benefit plans in
fact do not use sex-based mortality tables to establish sexdifferentiated optional benefit levels, according to a U.S.
Department of Labor survey, reported early in 1983,s2
and at least 30% of state and local workers were covered
by plans which provide sex-neutral joint and survivor options.s3 For example, railroad retirement plans already
provide survivor and all other benefits on a sex-neutral
basis.s 4 Numerous large private defined benefit plans
have long offered sex-neutral joint and survivor option_s,
including, among others, General Electric, IBM,
General Motors and plans covering the Steelworkers and
the United Auto Workers.ss
B. Defined Contribution Plans
Defined contribution plans, the type of plan at issue
in Norris, provide for contributions of a specified amount
each year on behalf of each employee. Future benefit
levels are not fixed, but depend on the amount of accumulated funds at retirement (contributions and net investment returns) allocated to individual accounts. The
amounts to be paid out in lifetime periodic benefits are
actuarily determined.
Under a typical contribution plan, the employer or
employee, or both, may make periodic contributions
equal to a specified percentage of the employee's salary.
The employer generally sends the contributions to an in-

81. The example given is for illustrative purposes only and omits
the role of interest in calculating present value. See Brief Amici
Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union and American Association of University Professors at 20 n.9, Manhan.
Plans requiring women to retire earlier than men, or blacks
earlier than whites, have been held unlawful under Title VII. Peters
v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 483 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1002 (1973)(race); Bartmess v. Drewrys, U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d
1186 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971)(sex); Fillinger v.
East Ohio Gas Co., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 73 (N. D. Ohio
1971)(sex). In addition, plans paying lower monthly benefits to male
early-retirees have been found unlawful under Title VII. Chastang v.
Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976); Rosen v. Public
Service Electric & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973); Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1974), rev(J on other grounds,
519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975)(failure to award attorney's fees), affd in
pan, rev(J in pan on other grounds, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)(failure to
award back pay).
82. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, COST STUDY, supra note 74 at 13.
83. See id. DEPT. at 81 n. 68.
84. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, COST IMPACT FOR DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS OF OFCCP's PROPOSED REGULATION REGARDING SEX
DISTINCTIONS IN FRINGE BENEFITS app. 2 (draft 1982).
85. Id. at app. 5.
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surance company which enters into a group annuity contract with the employer or an individual annuity contract
with the employee. When the worker retires, his or her
benefit is equal to the fixed or variable annuity that can
be purchased with the accumulated contributions plus investment earnings. In pricing annuities, insurance companies typically use the factors of age, sex and an interest
rate assumption. As in actuarial valuations in defined
benefit plans, the interest rate assumption has a significant impact on cost estimates in defined contribution
plans, and constitutes a much more important pricing
factor than the sex of the annuitant. As a safety margin,
advance guaranteed rates are based on a conservatively
low rate of interest. The safety margins are required
because insurers cannot accurately predict the future investment return at the time they receive the deferred annuity premiums. Benefits may in fact be based on interest
rates in effect at retirement, if more favorable than the
guaranteed rates. The Lincoln National annuity option
selected by Nathalie Norris, for example, guaranteed
Norris a monthly annuity benefit of $320.11 based upon
3.5 % interest. (The monthly guaranteed amount would
have been $354.06 if Norris had been male.) The Lincoln National contract provided that a participant's annuity would be based on rates in effect at retirement, if
more favorable than the advance guaranteed rates.
Assuming Lincoln National based its actual annuity
premium rates on 7.5 % interest, Norris' monthly annuity
would be approximately $443 or about 38 % more than
the $320.11 annuity under guaranteed rates.s 6
In defined contribution plans, trouble spots for sex
discrimination are found at the payout stage for all lifetime annuity benefit options. If sex-based actuarial tables
are used, a woman choosing a single life annuity would
receive lower periodic benefits than a similarly situated
man. Because the money accumulated in her individual
account at retirement would be equal to that of her male
counterpart, however, choice of a lump sum payment
would result in equal amounts for the man and woman.
(Lump sum payments do not pose problems in this context because they are not actuarily determined in defined
contribution plans.) Use of sex-based actuarial tables has
historically been more prevalent in defined contribution
plans than in defined benefit plans. The U.S. Department
of Labor reported in 1983 that 74 % of participants in
defined contribution plans, compared to 45 % in defined
benefit plans, were subject to sex-based computation of
periodic annuity benefits.s 7
86. See Brief of Eight Individual Actuaries as Amici Curiae in Norris at 9-13.
'ifl. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, COST STUDY, supra, note 74 at 10.
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C. Obtaining Information About An Employer's
Pension Plan
ERISA provides employees in the private sector with
rights of access to information about their employee pension benefit plan. Employers are required, under ERISA,
to give employees a summary plan description, which is
usually provided in booklet form. Employees may also
examine the more complete pension plan documents or
contact the plan administrator for more information.ss
In defined contribution plans, employees should examine the contract documents for use of sex-based actuarial factors to compute life annuity benefit amounts.
These are easily detected if the documents specify sexdifferentiated benefits. If sex-based classifications do not
appear on the face of the plan, there is usually a statement that benefits are calculated according to a specified
mortality table.s 9
In defined benefit plans, use ofsex-based actuarial
factors are sometimes more difficult to spot unless the
summary plan description give sex-differentiated examples of optional benefit amounts. Nevertheless, under
Revenue Ruling 79-90, the Internal Revenue Service now
requires qualified defined benefit pension plans90 to
specify the actuarial assumptions used to compute the
amounts of optional forms of retirement benefits.91 This
88. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1022, 1024(b)(2)(1984).
89. See supra note 32.
90. Pension plans that meet certain participation and vesting standards designated in the Internal Revenue Code are referred to as
qualified plans, and receive certain tax advantages not available to
nonqualified plans. Employer contributions to qualified plans are
deductible by the employer when made, but not taxed to the employee
until benefits are distributed from the plan at retirement. A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS, at 215-16.
91. See Rev. Rul. 79-90, 1979-1 C.B. 155. Under Revenue Ruling
79-90, defined benefit plans that provide optional forms of retirement
benefits that are actuarial equivalent to the normal retirement benefit
must specify the actuarial assumptions used to compute the optional
benefits. This requirement derives from Treasury Regulation
8 l.40l-l(b)(i)(l984) which requires defined benefit plans to provide
"definitely determinable" benefits. Plans in effect on March 12, 1979
were not required to specify their actuarial assumptions until January
l, 1984.
The question of whether any change in specified assumptions by
plan amendment would violate the Internal Revenue Code's prohibition against amendments that cause a reduction in accrued benefits
was considered in Revenue Ruling 81-12, 1981-1 C.B. 228. A supplemental ruling which addressed the relationship between Revenue
Ruling 79-90 and the anti-cutback rule in Internal Revenue Code Section 4ll(d)(6)(1984). Revenue Ruling 81-12 outlines changes in actuarial factors that indirectly affect accrued benefits, and describes
two methods that may be used to avoid a decrease in accrued benefits
where a plan amendment makes such a change.
According to the IRS, where a plan had "not yet specified ac.tuarial assumptions for optional benefits under Revenue Ruling 79-90
or Revenue Ruling 81-12, it would be able to go to unisex tables
without violating the benefit accrual provisions of the code 'as long
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will make it easier to spot sex discrimination in qualified
defined benefit plans. Fortunately, many plans voluntarily converted to sex-neutral actuarial factors in the process of complying with the new IRS requirements.92
IV. REMEDYING EMPLOYER NON-COMPLIANCE

Manhart and Norris require trial courts to use
equitable principles in determining the scope of relief
granted in pension discrimination cases. Consistent with
its remedial holdings in other Title VII cases, the Court
in Manhart and Norris reaffirmed the principle that relief
should be fashioned in each Title VII case with due
regard for the particular facts and circumstances
presented, but with added "equitable sensitivity" to the
potential impact of a retroactive remedy in the context of
pension cases.
The Court in both Manhart and Norris recognized
that in Title VII actions, there is a "presumption in favor
of retroactive liability" which "can seldom be overcome."93 In enacting Title VII, Congress intended to give
courts wide discretion in exercising their equitable
powers to fashion the most complete relief possible, including "make-whole remedies" designed to restore
plaintiffs "to a position where they would have been were

as the assumptions stated in the plans do not change."' Issues with
regard to plans that already specified sex~based assumptions for optional benefits have been under IRS sn1dy. See IRS Will Provide
Guidance For Pension Plans to Comply With Court Ruling in Norris
Case, DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA), No 190, at A-I0-11 (Sept. 29,
1983); cf Block & Cogan, Pension Strategies After Norris IO J.
PENS. PLAN. & COMPL. 131, 138-40 (1984); Ryan & Rock, PostNorris Ambiguities: Unanswered Questions for Women and the Pension Industry, 17 AKRON L. REV. 171, 190 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Ryan & Rock].
92. As noted in Hager & Zimpleman, The Norris Decision, Its Implications and Application, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 913, 937-38
(1982-83), the defined benefit plan sponi;or must decide whether to
apply the principles of Norris to all ber1efits accrued to date. The
authors point out that as a practical matter, "splitting the accruals into
pre- and post-August 1, 1983 accruals and using different factors for
each may be unnecessarily complicated in view of the employer's
cost." Id. at 938. See also survey results discussed in note 5, supra;
but see Ryan & Rock, supra note 91, at 190. Similarly, many defined contribution plans have complied with Norris by adopting unisex
factors for account balances arising from contributions before August
1, 1983. According to the Buck Consultants, Inc. survey referenced
in footnote 5, of those surveyed defined contribution plans adopting
unisex factors to comply with Norris, "70 percent will apply unisex
factors to participants' total account balances, and 19 percent will
apply the factors for future contributions only, while 11 percent of the
plans had not yet decided which appro:1ch to take." Firms Plan to
Switch to Unisex Plans in Response to Norris, Buck Survey Says, 10
PENS. REP. (BNA) 1688 (Nov. 7, 1983).
93. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 719, Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3502.
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it not for the unlawful discrimination." 94 In pension
cases, the presumption in favor of retroactive relief can
be overcome under Manhart and Norris if 1) the
employer had reason to believe its plan was lawful, and
2) retroactive relief would impose costs which would endanger the solvency of the plan, thereby jeopardizing the
expectations of employees to their retirement benefits.
Under these guidelines, the scope of relief that can
be obtained depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case.95 Accordingly, the employer's plan should be
closely scrutinized for the following factors: 1) whether
the relief requested would in fact be "retroactive;" 2)
whether the employer could have reasonably believed its
conduct was lawful in light of Manhart, i.e., whether the
plan offered a sex-neutral lump sum payment or was
funded through an independent third party insurance
company which offered annuities available on the open
market; and 3) what impact the requested relief would
have on the solvency of the plan and on the expectations
of its participants.
Spirt v. TIAA-CREF, recently decided by the Second
Circuit, and several other cases now pending on remand
from the Supreme Court for further consideration in light
of Norris raise these post-Norris relief issues.96 In Spirt,
the Second Circuit reinstated its pre-Norris judgment,
with one minor modification, and ordered that retirement benefits be equalized for all persons retiring after
May 1, 1980.97 Although characterizing its decision as
awarding "retroactive relief," the Second Circuit
distinguished the TIAA-CREF plan from the plan involved in Norris based on 1) the absence in Spirt of additional financial burdens imposed on the employer by
the relief order and 2) the fact that the participants in the
TIAA-CREF plan had no expectation of a "certain
stream of income" at retirement. The Spirt decision provides valuable guidance with regard to the scope of relief
permissible in post-Norris cases with distinguishable fact
patterns.

94. Albemarle Paper Co v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421
(l972)(quoting 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972)).
95. Cf Manhart, 435 U.S. at 722 n.42; Ryan & Rock, supra note
91, at 177-83.
96. See Spirt v. TIAA-CREF, 691 F. 2d. 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
granted and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3566 (1983), modified and affd,
735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, _ _ US. _ _ (1984), and cases
pending on remand cited supra note 6. See also EEOC v. TIAA, 84
Civ. 9294 (RJW)(S.D.N.Y.)(complaint filed Dec. 27, 1984).
97. The Second Circuit modified its prior decision in "one minor
respect" as follows:
We still consider the likelihood that TIAA will fail to
earn 2-112 % on its investment to be an insignificant
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A. Retroactivity
As previously discussed,98 the Supreme Court held
that when a court "directs a change in benefits based on
contributions made before the court's order, the court is
awarding relief that is fundamentally retroactive in
nature." 99 Plans should be closely examined, however, to
determine whether any applicable conversion provisions
transform past contributions into new contributions for
purposes of benefit computations. In addition, employer's actions should be scrutinized for any exercise of
discretionary authority during the post-Norris (or post~anhart) period to specify sex-based benefits computations. For defined benefit plans, it should be determined
whether the plan sponsor has made a post-Norris decision to comply with Revenue Ruling 79-90 by specifying
sex-based rather than sex-neutral actuarial factors used
to compute optional benefits. 100 A post-Norris decision
to specify sex-based actuarial factors when the plan sponsor had the discretion to specify sex-neutral factors may
also transform past contributions into new contributions.
In sum, for both types of plans, it should be determined
whether 1) plan participants receive post-Norris sexbased discretionary distributions or benefit increases
and 2) when and how retirement benefit amounts ar;
"settled" for retirees.
For example, the defined contribution plan at issue
in Spirt, has automatic conversion provisions which
arguably transform prior accumulations into a new
'
lump-sum contribution at retirement. Upon retirement
a paid-up TIAA plan will automatically be provided a~
a new, advantageous rate if the single premium annuity
available at retirement provides higher benefits than those
guaranteed under the paid-up plan. At retirement, the
TIAA participant surrenders to TIAA his or her deferr~~ annuity contract. For more than 99 per cent of participants, the accumulation in the TIAA account is then
used as a single lump sum to buy an annuity from TIAA

risk .. ~~wever, since Norris appears to foreclose any
poss1b1hty of the retroactive imposition of added financial burdens upon employers or plans we will direct the
Di~trict Court to modify its judgm~nt to provide that
umsex tables need not be used in calculating the portion
of benefits attributable to pre-judgment contributions to
whatever extent may be necessary in any year to ensure
that the use of such tables will not impose added financial b~rdens upon the employer or TIAA beyond those
resulting from the obligation to pay benefits reflecting
a 2-1/2% return on investment.
Spirt, 735 F.2d at 29.
98. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
99. 103 S. Ct. at 3503.
100. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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that will provide benefits at the higher single premium
annuity rate. 101 The variable annuity offered by TIAA's
companion organization, CREF, contains analogous conversion provisions.102
There is no question that all post-Norris (and in
some cases, post-Manhart) contributions must be used
to purchase sex-neutral benefits. The issue raised by the
above-described facts in Spirt is whether accumulated
contributions which are converted to a lump sum
premium for immediate annuities ought to be considered
new or old contributions. A compelling argument can be
made, and was made by the EEOC and other parties in
Spirt on remand, that such provisions convert the
accumulations into new contributions. Although the
Second Circuit's decision in Spirt did not adopt this argument as the basis for its decision on remand, such an approach could have provided a justifiable alternative basis
for the court's reinstatement of its pre-Norris judgment.
A similar argument can be made for certain optional
benefit conversions in defined benefit plans.103

B. Reasonable Belief that the Pension Plan Was Lawful
In rejecting retroactive relief in Manhart, the Court
emphasized that it was announcing a new rule of law, and
that conscientious and intelligent administrators of pension funds may well have assumed that their plans were
entirely lawful because "the courts had been silent on the
question, and the administrative agencies had conflicting
views." 104 In Norris, Justice Powell refused to apply the
Court's decision retroactively in part because under
Manhart's explicit "open market" limitation, "an
employer reasonably could have assumed that it would
be lawful to make available to its employees annuities offered by insurance companies on the open market." 10s
Manhart put employers on notice that employer
actions vis-a-vis retirement benefits must be sex-neutral.
Accordingly, employer-operated plans should be required
to equalize retroactively to at least April 1978, the date ~f

.101: See Brief for Appellant Equal Employment Opportunity Comm1ss10n at 21-24, Spirt.
. 102.
at 15-20.. Each contribution to CREF purchases accumulation umts representing the participant's proportionate share in CREF.
At the time th~ parti~ipant retires, the current value of all or part of
th~ accumulat10n umts can be used to purchase an immediate life annuity fr~m TIAA. The transfer is treated like a new TIAA premium.
Alter.nallv~ly, .the value of the accumulation may be used to purchase
annmty umts in CREF (a variable annuity which does not guarantee
any fixed dollar amount of annuity payments). The accumulation then
serves as a purchase price for a CREF immediate annuity.
103. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
104. 435 u.s, at 720.
. 10~. 103 S. Ct. at 3510 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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the Manhart decision. Equalization retroactive to the
EEOC equal benefits guideline adopted in 1972 may be
appropriate for those employer-operated plans with both
unequal contribution rates and unequal benefits. 106 Such
plans would have been in violation of both the Department of Labor's "either-or" rule and the EEOC's equal
benefits rule. 107 In addition, retroactive relief may be appropriate in those plans where the insurer itself acted as
an employer within the meaning of Title VII, and should
have known prior to Norris that its policies were
unlawful .108
C. Financial Impact on Pension Plans and Participants
In rejecting retroactive relief in Manhart and Norris, Justice Powell also emphasized the devastating financial impact a retroactive order could have on the reserves
of pension plans, and on state and local governments.
Justice O'Connor observed that requiring employers to
"disburse greater annuity benefits than the collected contributions can support would jeopardize the entire fund"
and that employees make retireme.nt decisions based on
"expectations of a certain stream of income during retirement." 109
None of these considerations apply when retroactive
relief could be obtained without changing the total anticipated obligations of the pension fund and without
diminishing the amount of benefits guaranteed to the participants. In fact, numerous major pension plans are currently overfunded, with substantially more assets than
needed to pay currently guaranteed benefits. 110 In Spirt

106. See Women in City Gov't. United v. City of New York, 515 F.
Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 198l)(relief issues pending).
107. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(f); see generally
Note, Title VII and TIAA-CREF, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1230, 1261-64
(1983).
108. See Spirt v. TIAA, 691 F.2d at 1067-68.
109. 463 S.Ct. at, 103 S.ct. at 3512 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
110. Instead of distributing excess ai;sets to employees, some
employers have recaptured pension plan assets for their own purposes. In hearings before the House Select Committee on Aging on
pension asset "raids" by employers, the committee expressed concern
over an unprecedented wave of pension plan terminations involving
reversions of excess plan assets. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation furnished data to the committee indicating that since 1980,
104 U.S. companies have recaptured in excess of $443 million from
the termination of 114 defined benefit pension plans. Additional information raised the committee's projected total of plan asset reversions to over $1.7 billion, "designed for no other apparent purpose
than to enable plan sponsors or their officials to strip long-established
and well-financed plans of so-called 'surplus' assets ..." See Letter
of Edward R. Roybal, Chairman of House Select Committee on Aging to Raymond J. Donovan, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Labor, (Nov.
3, 1983) 10 PENS. REP. BNA No. 470, at 1736 (Nov. 14, 1983). See
also Terminating Pension Plans, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1984, at 02,
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v. TIAA-CREF, for example, the Second Circuit concluded in its pre-Norris decision on relief that equalization of benefits for employees retiring after the date of the
court's order could be calculated "so as not to change the
total anticipated obligations of the funds." 111 With regard
to TIAA, such relief could be achieved without reducing
guaranteed benefits by redistributing excess investment
return amounts paid in the form of discretionary
dividends. 112 Readjustment of CREF benefits for persons
retiring after the date of the court's order posed no problem for the court because no reserves are established by
CREF. As a variable annuity, CREF provides no
guarantee of any fixed dollar payment.
In its post-Norris decision, the Second Circuit
reached the same result after "careful consideration of
the majority opinion in Norris on the issue of relief." 113
The court of appeals first emphasized that the "[p]remise
of Norris ruling against retroactivity-that equalization
of women's benefits requires the employer or the plan to
pay out extra sums of money-is inapplicable to the case
before us." 114 The relief ordered in Spirt would not
jeopardize any expectation of a "determinable benefit"
by imposing added financial burdens on the plan. The
court next acknowledged that the retroactive aspect of the
judgment would have an adverse economic impact on
male retirees as a class because men would receive fewer
dollars than the amounts they would have received if
gender-neutral tables were used. However, the use of
unisex tables would have no consequence for 60% of the
individual male participants who chose joint and survivor options. For the remaining 40% of the men, use of
unisex tables would mean a reduction of between 1% and
8 % of the benefits they would have received. Although
"somewhat uncertain as to the meaning of the Norris
decision" 115 because of the majority's failure in Norris
to comment on the dissent's preferred resolution of the
case, the Second Circuit observed that "it is difficult to
imagine why Justice Powell's opinion was so emphatic in
cautioning against the imposition of financial burdens on
employers and plans if in Norris it was contractually
possible to. make retroactive use of unisex tables and
thereby equalize benefits without imposing any financial
cols. 1-3 (".. :a combina_tion of (actors-among them, the 1982-1983
stock run-up, high interest rates, and conservative accounting procedures that value pension assets below their current market vauehas left most major pension funds with substantially more assets than
needed to pay employees' current benefits.")
111. Spirt v. TIAA, 691 F.2d at 1068.
112. Id.
113. Spirt v. TIAA-CREF, 735 F.2d at 27.
114. Id. at 26.
115. Id. at 28.
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burdens on the employer or the plan." 116 The court then
concluded that it saw nothing in Norris that "proscribes
retroactive provisions simply because unspecified benefit
levels for some male annuitants will be slightly lower
than whatever they would have been under genderdistinct tables." 117 The court reinstated its pre-Norris
judgment 1) enjoining the university after June 1980 from
contributing to a sex-based retirement plan and 2) enjoining CREF and TIAA from using such tables to calculate
annuity benefits for persons retiring after May 1, 1980.118
In sum, the Spirt decision provides a reasoned basis
for distinguishing the Norris situation, where the state
government would have been obligated to appropriate additional funds to equalize benefits, from those funded
plans where monies may be redistributed without reducing any participants' contractually guaranteed or determinable benefits. The Spirt rationale applies to any
funded plan where conservative interest rates have been
used to determine the amount of guaranteed benefits, and
where the benefits actually paid exceed the guaranteed
amounts.
D. Scope of Relief
The scope of relief which may be obtained in pension discrimination cases must be analyzed with the fac-

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Spirt v. TIAA-CREF involved only deferred annuitants, i.e.
those in the pay-in stage of the plan, and did not include any person
who had retired prior to the effective date of the district court's judgment, May 1. 1980. The EEOC has subsequently filed an action
against TIAA seeking relief for those persons retiring prior to May
1980. See EEOC v. TIAA, Civ. Action No. (RJW) (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
119. Consistent with the equitable principles outlined in Norris,
post-Manhart or post-Norris discretionary increases to retirees
should be made on a sex-neutral basis. Many pension plans have
made benefit increases to retirees over the last ten years. In a recent
study, Inflation and Pension Benefits, of a random sample of defined benefit private pension plans, the North Carolina State University
for the Department of Labor concluded that substantial benefit increases were paid to retirees in defined benefit plans during the period
1973-1979, especially among larger pension plans. The mean pension
benefit for persons already retired in 1973 increased from $2,128 in
1973 to $2,638 in 1979, an increase of 24 % . The annual rate of increase during the period ranged from 2.9 to 4.5%. See Retiree

Benefits Unable to Keep Pace With Inflation in 1970's, Study Finds,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No.24 at A-5-6 (Feb. 6, 1984). A November
1981 research survey of 95 companies entitled Pension Increases For
Retired Employees by Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby found that
most pension increases (83 %) were funded through the qualified
plan. Only 3 % of the companies reported having automatic, annual
increase provisions, and these provisions limit increases in any one
year to 3 % or 4 % . Median increases for representative pensioners
who retired January 1, 1975 ranged between 12 % and 19 % . The top
10% of the survey group increased pensions by 30% or more since
1975. Id. at 2-3.
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tors described above, and also according to the
employee's status as a retiree, present employee, or new
employee.

1. Retirees
Whether relief can be obtained for retirees will depend upon the date of retirement, when computations for
determining the amount of benefits to be received by the
retiree are made, and whether the retiree receives increases in benefits or discretionary dividends.
For example, if an employee retires after the effective date of the Norris decision and the employer then
· purchases a sex-based single premium immediate annuity for that employee, full relief should be obtainable. The
single premium annuity would be purchased by a postNorris contribution. Relief should also be sought where
post-Norris (or post-Manhart) dividends or other nonguaranteed benefits are paid to retirees, whether they
retired before or after Norris. On the other hand, if the
employee retired before the date of the Manhart decision,
and the full amount to be received at retirement was contractually determined at that time, and no increases or
dividends have been distributed by the plan during retirement, it will be virtually impossible to obtain relief.
Other possibilities lie between these extremes. PostNorris discretionary increases to retirees should be made
on a sex-neutral basis. 119 In addition, it is possible that
relief for post-Manhart retirees may be obtained for that
portion of benefits attributable to post-Manhart contributions if the employer could not reasonably have believed
the sex-based plan was lawful, and for benefits based on
pre-Manhart and pre-Norris contributions under the
conversion 120 and cost 121 theories outlined above.

2. Present employees
Whether full relief for present employees may be
obtained depends on when the contributions are made
and when the computations for determining the amount
of benefits to be received upon retirement are finally
made. Benefits based on post-Norris (and possibly postManhart) contributions must be equalized. Whether
relief can be obtained for pre-Norris or pre-Manhart
contributions depends on the resolution of the issues
discussed above. 122 Some pension and annuity experts

120. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 109-118 and accompanying text.
122. See supra discussion accompanying notes 98-118. In Spirt v.
TIAA-CREF, supra note 96, for example, the Second Circuit granted
full relief for all present employees. Upon retirement, equal benefits
must be paid, including those benefits based on contributions made
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have predicted that it may be "unnecesarily complex" to
split pre- and post-Norris contributions, implying that it
may be more economical for employers to simply make
plans uniformly sex-neutral. 123
The issue of whether equalization of benefits means
paying the benefits at the more favorable rate, "topping
up," or paying them at a level determined by a weighted
average, "mid-pointing," was not explicitly resolved by
the Court in Norris. In Manhart, the Supreme Court sustained the lower court's injunction prohibiting the
employer from charging women the formerly applicable
higher contribution rates,124 there.by tacitly approving a
prior to Norris and Manhart. The Spin judgment and order, entered
by the district court in December 1984, contains compliance provisions agreed upon by the parties in a negotiated settlement of
previously unresolved relief issues. The compliance provisions require TIAA-CREF to apply a sex-neutral TIAA dividend f~rmula for
all persons retiring after the implementation date of January l, 1985.
(The "dividend formula" is used to compute total TIAA benefits for
virtually all retirees except in the very unlikely eventuality that total
earnings would fall below a certain minimum level, in which case the,
original guarantees would apply.) TIAA-CREF is also required to
compute on a sex-neutral basis the number of CREF annuity units for
all CREF annuities issued after May 1, 1980. For those persons who
retired with "less favored" TIAA or CREF sex-based benefits between the effective date of the original district court judgment, May
1, 1980, and the implementation date of January 1, 1985, "topping
up" is required. The agreement provides that the "aggregate of any
such underpayments, without interest, will be paid by TIAA and/or
CREF to each annuitant under such less favored annuity on January
l, 1985 or as soon as practicable thereafter." The agreement applies
quite broadly to all payout annuities issued on or after May 1, 1980
arising from "deferred annuity maturitie..~," including tax deferred annuities and supplemental retirement annuities, single premium immediate annuities, CREF transfers to TIAA (and TIAA life insurance
proceeds transferred to CREF), Group Annuity transfers, preretirement deaths under deferred annuities, and from deaths, matured
endowments and cash surrenders under TIAA life insurance contracts. See Spirt v. TIAA-CREF, 74 Civ. 1674 (RJW), Judgment and
Order (Dec. 5, 1984).
In Women in City Gov't. United v. City of New York, the parties recently agreed to a proposed partial settlement of relief issues
which will provide equal benefits to all Class members who were active members of the New Uork City Retirement System as of July 31,
1983. The relief provided under the consent decree includes equalization of all retirement allowances and death benefits applicable to the
settling class plaintiffs with those of similarly situated males from the
date of each such plaintiffs retirement, with interest. The agreement
also provides that such equalization will be accomplished at levels at
least as favorable as the most favorable level currently available to settling class plaintiffs or similarly situated males, i.e. "topping up" to
the male level. See Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York,
75 Civ. 2868 (MJL), Proposed Consent Decree (Feb. 13, 1985).
Relief issues involving retirees have not yet been resolved, although
they were under negotiation in mid-February 1985.
123. See Hager & Zippleman, 1he Norris Decision, Its Implications and Applications, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 913, 937 (1982-83)
[hereinafter cited as Hager & Zimpleman].
124. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 553 F.2d
581, 583 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated on otlier grounds, 435 U.S. 702, on
remand, 577 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1978).
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"topping up" remedy. The four dissenters in the Norris
decision on relief explicitly approved a "topping up"
remedy by stating that "there is no unfairness in requiring [Arizona] to pay retired female employees whatever
the sum is necessary each month to bring them up to the
benefit level that they would have enjoyed had their postManhart contribution been treated in the same way as·
those of similarly situated male employees. 125 In the majority's decision on relief, Justice Powell does not explicitly indicate the proper method of equalization.
However, because relief was limited to prospective
equalization in large part due to the asserted high cost of
a "topping up" retroactive remedy, the majority's decision contains the implicit assumption that "topping up"
would hav~ been the applicable remedy. 126 Only Justice
O'Connor rejected "topping up" and adopted "midpointing" as the appropriate method of equalization. 127
Where retroactive relief is applicable, and where
employees have a protectable guarantee of a particular
level of benefits, the "topping up" method of equalization may be the mandatory remedy. 128 In some cases,
'· however, "mid-pointing" may result in benefits at the
same level, or higher, than guaranteed levels. This can
occur where favorable investment experience permits the
plan to make discretionary distributions in excess of the
interest rate assumed or specified in the guaranteed
benefit computation formula. It should be noted that the
Equal Pay Act forbids employers from remedying equal
pay violations by reducing the wage rate of any
employee. Although the same rule should also apply to
Title VII, and may be incorporated through operation of
the Bennett Amendment, the Supreme Court has not yet
resolved the application of the rule in the pension context. Practitioners should therefore consider including
Equal Pay Act claims in addition to Title VII claims
when challenging sex discrimination in pension plans. 129
125. 103 S.Ct. at 3503.
126. 103 S.Ct. at 3510 n.ll; see Spirt v. TIAA, 735 F.2d 23, 26.
127. 103 S.ct. at 3512 n.4.
128. See discussion of Spirt and Ubmen in City Gov't United, supm
note 117.
129. See supm note 46. However, in her concurring opinion in Norris, Justice O'Connor, 103 S.Ct. at 3512 n. 4, questioned the application of the Equal Pay Act proviso to pension discrimination claims.
Nevertheless, as noted in Block & Cogan, Pension Strategies After
Norris, 10 J. PENS. PLAN. & COMP at 147, because "there is uncertainty as to whether the Equal Pay Act prohibits the reduction in
benefits of the favored class in order to bring a plan into compliance
with the Act," the topping up approach "has the salutory effect of
eliminating the danger of a retroactive award being imposed against
an employer." But see Ryan & Rock, supm note 91, at 183-91 (relies
on Department of Labor Cost Study (see supm note 74) to compare
costs of "topping up" and "midpointing," but fails to consider
distribution of excess plan assets, in arguing against retroactive
equalization of benefits).
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3. New employees
All benefits based on post-Norris contributions must
be equalized, and therefore new employees must receive
sex-neutral benefits at retirement.

V. CONCLUSION

Norris demarcated employer liability under Title VIl
for payment of sex-differentiated pension benefits.
Although Norris applied equitable factors in denying
retroactive relief, it remains to be decided by the Court
whether such relief is an appropriate remedy in factually
distinguishable pension discrimination cases. The Second Circuit has decided in Spirt v. TIAA-CREF that
retroactive relief may be appropriate where such relief
poses no financial burden on the employer or plan, and
where it would not jeopardize any expectation of retirees
to a determinable benefit. Accordingly, in determining
the scope of relief obtainable, pension plans should be

scrutinzed closely for distinguishing features so that the
most complete and appropriate remedies may be aggressively sought under the principles established in

Norris.
The reasoning of the Norris decision logically extends to a range of employee fringe benefits, such as life
insurance, medical coverage and disability insurance
plans. Therefore, the analysis applied in Norris would
also prohibit any employer-sponsored fringe benefit
which makes sex-differentiated payments based on
sex-differentiated actuarial data.13° Because the impact
of Norris is limited to employer-sponsored pension and
insurance plans, however, progress in the passing of
legislation designed to prohibit sex-differentiation in
open market insurance plans remains vitally important
as a means of ensuring economic equality for women. 131
130. Hager & Zimpleman, supra note 118, at 941-42.
131. See supra note 61.
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